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Brexit: Why, What Next 
aNd hoW?
iaiN Begg*
Now that the unexpected has occurred, what about 
half  the British electorate regard as the unpalatable 
process of leaving the EU is likely to happen. In fact, it 
could be more than half  if  those who voted in protest, 
rather than out of conviction are counted. There are 
even commentators in Britain who query whether 
Brexit will go ahead. In this regard, the lack of a writ-
ten constitution in this country could well be critical, 
because the very absence of a clear pathway means 
that much is possible. However, the unprecedentedly 
rapid anointment of Theresa May as David Cameron’s 
successor and the mix of cabinet ministers she has ap-
pointed suggest that for her government, at least, there 
can be no turning-back. Yet there are still many un-
knowns about how Britain will go about disengaging 
itself  from the EU, the timetable and what the most 
likely outcome will be, and what it will imply for the 
future of European integration.
Britain has long had a much more transactional and 
less political approach to EU membership than most 
other Member States. Having been present at the 
Messina talks in 1956 that led to the Treaty of Rome, 
Britain chose not to participate in the founding of the 
European Economic Community, but by the 1960s the 
strategic economic case for shifting from the Com-
monwealth as a key trading partner to the (then) dy-
namic market of continental Europe was increasingly 
compelling. Not joining the euro was, similarly, more 
of an economic calculation based on Gordon Brown’s 
‘five economic tests’1 than an overtly political decision 
(see also Brown 2016).
This stance has meant that Britain has often been at 
odds with its EU partners, although it frequently gave 
1 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treas-
ury.gov.uk/documents/international_issues/the_euro/assessment/re-
port/euro_assess03_repintro.cfm.
voice to views others were reluctant to express. Even 
so, the deal negotiated by Cameron in February gave 
fresh impetus to British exceptionalism, albeit with 
the ironic outcome that it barely featured in the cam-
paign. The deal now lapses following the vote for 
Brexit, yet it is an open question whether the genie of 
differentiated integration is now out of the bottle. 
This paper looks at the economics of Brexit, considers 
why the referendum resulted in the vote to leave and 
explores what the ramifications are for both Britain 
and the future of the European Union.
The economics of Brexit
As the referendum campaign proceeded, studies of 
the likely impact of Brexit proliferated. Few readers 
will be surprised that some of the more positive as-
sessments emanated from supporters of Brexit (for ex-
ample, a group of Economists for Brexit2) and vice ver-
sa. International organisations such as the IMF and 
the OECD also weighed into the debate, though more 
from the standpoint of assessing global risks, while 
the Bank of England, in various interventions, 
stressed its duty to speak up on risks, especially to fi-
nancial stability. There were also studies looking only 
at certain facets of Brexit. Examples include analysis 
of the direct effect of Brexit on the Britain’s public 
finances,3 assessments of the regulatory burden on this 
country and the impact on jobs.
A lengthy study by HM Treasury4 represented the of-
ficial government position and can be placed within 
the mainstream. Other influential mainstream studies 
included a series of papers by economists at the Centre 
for Economic Performance at the London School of 
Economics, Oxford Economics and the National 
Institute for Economic and Social Research. What 
these studies all found was that the long-term effect of 
Brexit will be to reduce UK GDP compared with the 
2 http://www.economistsforbrexit.co.uk/.
3 See e.g. http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Who-
pays-for-the-EU-and-how-much-does-it-cost-the-UK-Disentangling-
fact-from-fiction-in-the-EU-Budget-Professor-Iain-Begg.pdf.
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/517415/treasury_analysis_economic_impact_of_eu_
membership_web.pdf.
* London School of Economics and The UK in a Changing Europe 
Initiative.
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counterfactual of staying in the Union, but with the 
extent of the loss contingent on the terms of the post-
Brexit trade and investment regime.
Although there are inevitably differences in method-
ologies and assumptions between different studies, the 
HM Treasury study is fairly representative in setting 
out three scenarios reflecting possible reconfigurations 
of the post-Brexit UK relationship with the remainder 
of the EU (rEU). These are: an arrangement similar 
to Norway, with nearly the same market access; a 
‘Canada model’ akin to the one currently in the con-
cluding stages of negotiation between the EU and 
Canada; and a ‘WTO model’ in which Britain has only 
the same most favoured nation status as other third 
countries. The Treasury’s conclusion is succinct: “the 
UK would be permanently poorer if  it left the EU and 
adopted any of these alternative relationships”. 
Work by Minford,5 using a rational expectations mod-
el, secured attention as the main alternative view, find-
ing that the UK economy could prosper outside the 
EU. His reasoning is, in part, the rational expectations 
one that Brexit is so far-reaching a regime change that 
previous statistical regularities have little relevance – a 
classic Lucas critique argument. The analysis also re-
lies on the assumptions that British consumers will 
gain from switching from producers protected by EU 
trade restrictions to cheaper world prices, while UK 
businesses can benefit from avoiding costly regulations 
imposed by ‘Brussels’. According to Minford, these 
factors will add up to a four percent gain in GDP.
In a further study, HM Treasury6 suggests considera-
ble short-term risks from Brexit, including the possi-
bility of triggering a recession. The main reason is that 
a decision to leave would inflict a negative shock on 
the economy, although in the most optimistic scenario 
it might be short-lived. However, the study also noted 
that there were already signs of some of these factors 
weighing on the UK economy in the form of higher 
risk premia for UK debt and a decline in business con-
fidence. The three distinct components of the expected 
shock are:
• The direct ‘transition effect’ of shifting to less open 
trade and investment regimes. Employers reliant on 
the current trade regime would be faced with pres-
5 http://www.economistsforbrexit.co.uk/.
6 h t t p s : / / w w w. g o v . u k / g o v e r n m e n t / p u b l i c a t i o n s /
hm-treasury-analysis-the-immediate-economic-impact-of-leaving-
the-eu.
sures to reduce costs and would be expected to re-
duce investment.
• An uncertainty effect leading investors to put off  
decisions on new projects, leading to lower demand 
in the economy. 
• A financial stability effect resulting from a reassess-
ment by financial markets of the riskiness of UK 
assets.
A mild ‘shock’ scenario results not only in a loss of 
3.6  percent in GDP over two years, compared with 
what would otherwise happen and a jump in unem-
ployment, but also higher inflation because of a fall in 
the pound – something that has already happened 
since the 23rd of June. Under the ‘severe shock‘ sce-
nario, GDP would be some 6 percent lower after two 
years and the unemployment and inflation effects 
would be greater. Moreover, the Treasury does not al-
low for what it calls ‘tipping-points’ such as a sudden 
stop in the willingness of financial markets to finance 
the already large UK deficit on the current account of 
the balance of payments.
Unsurprisingly, the analysis was criticised as scare-
mongering, yet the Treasury findings are consistent 
with others (even the Economists for Brexit accept 
some short-term disruption) in pointing-out that the 
conjunction of uncertainty about the outcome and 
the dislocations that will arise from Brexit will reduce 
GDP. What distinguishes the various protagonists is, 
first, whether it is by enough to result in recession, and 
second, whether it has an enduring impact or is only a 
transitional cost likely to be rapidly overcome. 
According to the IMF in its routine Article 5 report 
for 2016 on Britain,7 ‘the largest near-term risk relates 
to the referendum on EU membership’, explaining 
that Brexit would create uncertainty about future UK 
trading relationships with rEU, the sixty other coun-
tries which are covered by collective EU deals and a 
further sixty-seven currently under discussion. Like 
many other commentators, the IMF argues that nego-
tiating new deals for an independent Britain would be 
a lengthy process. A distinctive element in the IMF as-
sessment is that Brexit could well accentuate some of 
the other risks to the UK economy, such as weak pro-
ductivity, the housing market and the sizeable balance 
of payment deficit on current account. Kierzenkowski 
et al. (2016) express concern that a slowdown in in-
ward investment would aggravate an already poor 
productivity record, undermining potential growth.
7 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16168.pdf.
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Competing methodologies
These various exercises raised methodological ques-
tions about how a change as profound as Brexit can 
best be modelled. Several of the mainstream approach-
es use ‘gravity models’ predicting more intensive trade 
and investment flows between countries geographically 
close to one another. There is both a strong theoretical 
basis for this and, as a paper from the LSE’s Centre for 
Economic Performance (CEP)8 stresses, empirical evi-
dence. However, Minford remains highly critical of 
gravity models, despite the evidence that they predict 
the levels of trade well in a statistical sense, but only as 
long as the basic assumption that everything else is 
held constant is true – i.e. all the shocks and fixed as-
sumptions implicit in the underlying empirical analy-
sis, such as other tariff  and policy changes and techno-
logical developments. He goes on to argue that when 
there is a wide-ranging change not only in the trade 
regime, but also in the nature of regulation, the statisti-
cal regularities on which the gravity models depend 
cease to be reliable. He also asserts that the nature of 
the relationships will differ depending on the sort of 
change and its magnitude. By implication a small 
change in, say, a tariff  (such as reducing it from 10 per-
cent to 8 percent) can be analysed using these tools, but 
a wholesale change in the regime cannot.
In its hard-hitting rebuttal of the Minford critique, the 
authors from the CEP observe that to take the posi-
tion that since no econometric work can be perfect, all 
inconvenient facts should be ignored is poor scholar-
ship and bad science. They also assert that the argu-
mentation by Minford is flawed because it relies only 
on theoretical propositions of dubious merit. The 
core of Minford’s argument is that, because the EU is 
a customs union, the tariffs it imposes on imports 
from the rest of the world, together with regulatory re-
strictions (especially on service industries) are 
trade-reducing.
The influence of movement of workers
One dimension worth stressing is that immigration 
has been a major driver of growth in Britain, account-
ing for perhaps half  of recent growth according to 
Kierzenkowski et al. (2016). Yet, this is precisely the 
point that opponents of free movement highlight: the 
higher growth does not necessarily benefit indigenous 
people. EU migrants (who ought, in any case, to be de-
8 http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit06.pdf.
scribed more accurately as mobile workers) have a 
higher employment rate than indigenous workers, 
make a net contribution to public finances and help to 
fill labour shortages in industries such as health care 
and agriculture). Many of those classed as immigrants 
from EU countries are, moreover, students and thus 
constitute invisible exports by a globally competitive 
UK industry: the university sector.
According to data summarised by Lisenkova and 
Sanchez-Martinez (2016), the share of migrants in the 
working-age population doubled between 1995 and 
2014 to 17 percent. However, this has not had an ad-
verse effect on the unemployment rate of indigenous 
workers, even amongst lower skill groups, although 
there is some evidence of a small downward pressure 
on wage rates.9 Migrants have also consistently made a 
net contribution to the public finances according to 
Dustmann and Frattini,10 although it has to be re-
called that this finding aggregates very high earning 
professionals alongside agricultural workers paid the 
minimum wage.
Nevertheless, migration ultimately became the biggest 
factor influencing the outcome of the referendum for 
an obvious, if  under-appreciated reason: the claims of 
aggregate gains simply did not resonate at the level of 
the individual. Pressure on school places, health ser-
vices or (the limited) stock of social housing meant 
that, in many localities citizens could point to direct 
adverse consequences for them, whereas the macroe-
conomic benefits were much more abstract. Those 
who pointed out that if  public services were not keep-
ing pace with the additional demands, it was the gov-
ernment’s fault, not the migrants’, were unable to 
make headway with their argument. 
There is, arguably, a lesson here about the use of ag-
gregates. Whether it is the economic effects of migra-
tion or claims about changes in GDP, they can be very 
remote from the circumstances of the individual. In 
the end, none of us is average and quoting averages 
can be counter-productive.
Can the vote be explained?
Although the foregoing economic analysis featured 
prominently in the campaign and was generally seen 
9 However, as wage rates were the principal channel for adjustment 
of the UK labour market during the crisis years, this effect will have 
been marginal by comparison.
10 http://www.cream-migration.org/files/FiscalEJ.pdf.
33 CESifo Forum 2/2016 (June)
Special
as among the more powerful of the ‘remain’ argu-
ments, it gave rise to a narrative labelled ‘project fear’, 
enabling the opposition campaigns to portray Brexit 
in much more positive terms. Through a combination 
of disciplined focus on the compelling slogan ‘take 
back control’ and, it has to be said, cynical misrepre-
sentation of facts about, for example, the potential 
budget savings from Brexit and of the prospect of 
waves of Turkish migrants arriving in Britain, the 
‘leave’ side was able to project a more positive case.
The vote for Brexit was unusual in the nature of the 
groupings on either side, reflecting a range of different 
cleavages within British society. Older people and the 
less well-educated wanted Brexit, while youths and 
those with university degrees favoured remain. 
London and Scotland voted very emphatically for re-
main, and there was a majority for it in Northern 
Ireland, but much of the rest of England voted leave, 
as did Wales. One particular group that probably 
proved decisive was the core Labour party supporters 
in England who seem to have rejected their party’s line 
to support ‘remain’. In places this was something of a 
puzzle given the specialisation of the local economy: 
in Sunderland, home to the giant Nissan factory 
which exports more than half  its output to other EU 
countries, barley a third of voters went for remain. 
The implication is that economic self-interest was be-
ing over-shadowed by other considerations.
One interpretation of the result is that British voters 
have ignored their leaders, rejecting warnings from ex-
perts about likely negative consequences. This echoes 
developments in other mature economies. In France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, nationalist parties 
have made significant progress, while in Greece and 
Portugal, parties that reject current economic ortho-
doxies have made rapid advances. Similarly, the suc-
cess of the anti-establishment campaigns of Trump 
and Sanders in the United States testifies to a wide-
spread disenchantment about globalisation. It is prob-
ably too early to sound the death-knell for globalisa-
tion, but it is worth recalling that the globalisation of 
a century ago went into reverse.
The polls struggled to track voters’ intentions and 
were quite volatile throughout the campaign, but by 
the day of voting, seemed to signal that ‘remain’ would 
win, as did the bookmakers. That they were proved so 
decisively wrong is due to a combination of reasons. A 
first is misunderstanding the depth of hostility to mi-
grants, especially among working-class Labour voters. 
Second, because there is no real tradition of referenda 
in Britain, the pollsters have very little history to draw 
upon in interpolating from their surveys, in contrast 
to general elections. More fundamentally, the result 
reflects a new mood in the electorate of antagonism to 
elites and experts, and even the polling organisations 
may be regarded as part of this elite and thus not to be 
trusted.
The tone of the campaigns made a difference. Brexit 
was able to sound positive, whereas remain came over 
as defensive and focused on what could go wrong if  
Britain left the EU, with too few of its representatives 
setting out positive reasons for staying. With hindsight, 
years of Brussels-bashing across the political spectrum 
in Britain took a toll and meant that those politicians 
trying to make the case for EU membership came over 
as lukewarm and unconvincing. Two examples illus-
trate this. First, prior to concluding the February rene-
gotiation, David Cameron made clear that unless a sat-
isfactory deal could be reached on what were, after all, 
relatively minor demands, he would recommend a 
Brexit. When he subsequently spoke of Brexit as a risk 
to world peace and laid out all the risks he foresaw, it 
was not exactly persuasive. Second, the Labour leader, 
Jeremy Corbyn, had been associated with the left cam-
paigns in the 1980s against European integration and, 
when asked on one occasion11 about his new enthusi-
asm for the EU, said he gave the EU ‘seven, seven and a 
half, maybe seven’ out of ten. In the same interview, 
Corbyn also explained his refusal to share a platform 
with David Cameron as being because his case for the 
EU was entirely different.
It is no surprise, therefore that potential ‘remain’ voters 
were confused, especially among working-class Labour 
voters who had trouble deciphering their own party’s 
message. In the end it seemed to come down to a choice 
between the emotional appeal of regaining identity, 
the right to control borders and to curb immigration, 
on one side, against the likelihood that Brexit would be 
economically damaging, on the other.
What next?
It is hard to know what Britain wants and, more im-
portantly, can plausibly expect from a new deal with 
its erstwhile EU partners. The models examined in the 
economic studies are all potential options, but all have 
potential shortcomings. The Norway model would al-
11 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36044383.
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low Britain to retain much of the market access it cur-
rently enjoys to rEU, but with three substantive com-
plications from a UK perspective. First it would mean 
Britain continuing to make a net contribution to the 
EU budget. Second, it means accepting freedom of 
movement and, third, it would mean accepting sub-
stantial amounts of regulation with a diminished ca-
pacity to influence the rules. Given that savings on the 
EU budget, curbs on free movement and ‘taking back 
control’ were core themes of the ‘leave’ campaign, the 
Norway model as an alternative looks unappealing. It 
is also likely to be resisted by rEU, if  only to deter oth-
er Member States from seeking such deals.
The ‘Canada model’ would entail a free trade agree-
ment, with few restrictions on trade in goods, thereby 
enabling major UK exporters to avoid what could be 
significant tariffs on exports to the rEU that could re-
sult from the ‘WTO model’. Carmakers, in particular, 
would be deeply concerned if  they were subject to the 
EU’s ten percent common external tariff. However, the 
Canada model does not cover many of the non-tariff  
barriers that could inhibit UK exports of services, es-
pecially the financial and business services produced by 
the City of London. It is no surprise, therefore, that the 
City is apprehensive. It is also too easily forgotten that 
in both the Canada and WTO models, trade between 
Britain and rEU is expected to shrink, probably with 
mutually negative damaging effects.
It will certainly be harder outside the EU for the City 
to be the principal financial centre for the Eurozone 
and the European Central Bank may press for some 
activities, such as clearing, to be located only inside 
the EU. In addition, some leading banks have stated 
that they will need to shift jobs from London to cen-
tres inside the Eurozone, all of which points to a 
steady loss of activity for London. However, the City 
is a global financial centre and has, when challenged in 
the past, shown a capacity to reinvent itself. Other 
European financial centres – not least Frankfurt and 
Paris, may gain marginally from what London loses, 
but considering the global dimension, it is more likely 
to be a negative sum game than a zero-sum one.
The future relationship in other policy domains has 
been given much less attention but is nevertheless im-
portant. Britain has been one of the leading actors in 
EU security policy and in international relations. 
Some new arrangement will be reached in due course, 
but it will not be easy because the Brexit process will 
have eroded trust between Britain and its current EU 
partners. In some ways, Britain will go on as before. It 
will retain its seat on the UN Security Council, have a 
strong voice in the IMF, still be a leading member of 
NATO and be a major economy. But it risks becoming 
isolated, rather than being a leading actor in the 
world’s largest trading bloc.
Economic spillover
International institutions, notably the OECD and the 
IMF, produced a series of analyses highlighting both 
the risks to the UK economy and to global economic 
prospects. In its latest Economic Outlook, the OECD 
(2016) identifies Brexit as a major downside risk for 
the global economy, even before the vote occurred, 
and commented that it was on the basis that the ver-
dict would be ‘remain’. The analysis suggested that the 
‘leave’ vote would worsen financial instability and 
cause some loss of asset values. Even Janet Yellen of 
the Federal Reserve,12 speaking in Philadelphia in 
June 2016, cited Brexit as one of the downside risks 
for the US economy, with the corollary that normali-
sation of monetary policy will again be postponed.
The effects on other parts of  the world of  Brexit (by 
2018) have been calculated by the OECD, distinguish-
ing between the effects of  the shock on Britain and on 
the EU. The main channels are through the financial 
effect, the trade effect and an effect on FDI. Figure 1 
shows these calculations and reveals that the UK 
shock is more significant for other parts of  the world 
than the direct effect of  an EU shock. By contrast, in-
side Europe, albeit to differing degrees, it is an EU 
shock that will dominate. In the OECD analysis, the 
EU countries are classified into three groups accord-
ing to the strength of  their linkages to Britain on 
three sets of  metrics – import demand from Britain as 
a share of  the country’s GDP; the stock of  FDI from 
the country in Britain, again as a proportion of  GDP; 
and what is referred to as a ‘big data indicator of  link-
ages from Google trends’. Ireland and the Nether-
lands, unsurprisingly are assessed as being most ex-
posed, as is Luxembourg, whereas Italy and much of 
central and eastern Europe are least exposed. A mid-
dle group includes Germany (which has, so far, made 
sympathetic noises about how to accommodate the 
likely post-Brexit demands from Britain), but also 
France and Spain which have been signalling a less 
supportive stance.
12 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yelle-
n20160606a.htm.
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Public finances
The departure of  Britain will mean a reduction of 
up to the full UK gross contribution to the budget, 
depending on whether the future relationship be-
tween Britain and rEU includes some continuing fi-
nancial contribution, as with the EFTA countries. 
To put it in perspective, the loss of  the British gross, 
post-rebate contribution is equivalent to most of  the 
budget for line 1a, ‘Competitiveness for growth and 
jobs’, or to around a third of  the budget for Co-
hesion Policy. 
From this UK contribution, some spending from EU 
programmes accrues to Britain, such that the net con-
tribution is lower, but the loss of  the UK payment 
would still leave a big hole to be filled, prompting an 
obvious question: will the other net contributors 
agree to pay more, or will today’s net recipients be 
obliged to accept less. Formally, the EU’s spending 
plans are embodied in the Medium-Term Financial 
Framework (MFF) in which the agreed expenditure 
determines how much Member States have to con-
tribute. Unless the current MFF is over-ridden, the 
net contributors (not least Germany) will face a high-
er bill for the EU at a time when this could prove po-
litically awkward.
However, these direct effects will be relatively trivial if  
the wider economic effect of Brexit is adverse. Lower 
GDP means, ceteris paribus, lower public revenues and 
higher demands on public spending, not just in Britain 
but also in rEU, suggesting a plausible lose-lose eco-
nomic scenario, dominating the direct effects of EU 
budget changes.
A word on Scotland
There has been speculation about 
a possible break-up of Britain be-
cause of the very strong support 
for remain in Scotland and, to a 
lesser extent, Northern Ireland. 
The Scottish Nationalists face a 
trilemma. They have a clear polit-
ical opportunity afforded by the 
message that England has taken 
the Scots out of a Europe to 
which they want to belong and 
the possibility that resistance to 
rapid Scottish accession to the 
EU would be muted. At the same 
time, it is questionable whether enough of the 55 per-
cent of Scottish electorate who voted against Scottish 
independence in September 2014 will have changed 
their minds, despite the subsequent electoral success 
of the nationalists. 
The third issue is the economy and its implication for 
the public finances. In the 2014 Scottish referendum, a 
weakness of the ‘yes’ campaign was that it was unclear 
what currency arrangement would ensue from inde-
pendence and there were doubts about the public fi-
nances. Since then the steep fall in the oil price has 
slashed revenue from oil on which an independent 
Scotland would rely, to the extent that an independent 
Scotland today would face a dangerously high deficit 
and maybe even a bailout.
Assessment
Despite the polls showing how tight the vote was likely 
to be, not only was the result generally regarded as a 
surprise, but it was also clear that there was no real 
plan for what happened next. There has been much 
debate about Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, the pro-
vision that enables a country to leave the EU. It has to 
be triggered by the Member State seeking to exit and, 
although there have been evident signs of impatience 
in Brussels (and in a number of national capitals) that 
it did not happen immediately, there is little the EU in-
stitutions can do to accelerate it. With the caveat that 
in the current febrile political context the unexpected 
has become the normal, making any prediction haz-
ardous, the signals emanating from Westminster, both 
from Theresa May and David Davis, the Minister she 
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has appointed to pursue Brexit are that Britain will 
not invoke Article 50 before the end of 2016.
Financial volatility has already been evident since the 
referendum vote, adding to a slowdown identified by 
the IMF prior to the vote in property transactions and 
prompting the Bank of England at its July 2016 rate-
setting meeting to signal monetary easing later in the 
summer. For rEU, some adverse effects are already 
surfacing, not least the extent of the pressure on 
Italian banks. It could be argued that their problem of 
non-performing loans was always going to have to be 
confronted and that it has little to do with the pro-
Brexit vote. However, the erosion of confidence asso-
ciated with the uncertainty about what happens next 
manifestly has not helped.
Paradoxes abound in the Brexit decision. A first is the 
general agreement that the UK economy has recov-
ered better than most from the great recession in 2008, 
despite being so closely tied to the EU. In addition, the 
UK economy has achieved something of a turna-
round since joining in 1973, with the implication that 
membership has been good for the economy, although 
a standard retort from the ‘leave’ side is that the suc-
cess of the British economy is due not to EU member-
ship, but to the extensive supply-side reforms of the 
Thatcher era.
Second, the EU has, in several respects shifted its pref-
erences very much towards those of Britain and, to 
their dismay, away from those of countries like France. 
The single market, better regulation and a global out-
look are all watchwords for what Britain wants, and 
federal ambitions have waned, making it all the more 
odd that this country has chosen to leave now. A fur-
ther paradox is that areas which have benefitted from 
EU membership – including the parts of Wales and 
England in receipt of the highest flows from EU 
Cohesion Policy – have proved to be hostile.
Yet another paradox is that hostility to migrants – one 
of the key themes of the ‘leave’ campaign – is not well 
correlated with where migrants are concentrated. 
London, with a high migrant share, voted strongly to 
remain, while many parts of l’angleterre profonde 
where there are few migrants voted to leave. Equally, in 
certain localities where low-skilled migrants are nu-
merous, such as Boston in the East English county of 
Lincolnshire, opposition to migrants was a critical rea-
son for high votes to leave. The explanation can be sim-
ply stated: migrants crowd-out locals in accessing pub-
lic services and are blamed for depressing wages at the 
bottom end of the wage distribution. These phenome-
na are strong negatives for those who see themselves as 
losers from globalisation/economic in tegration.
For the EU as a whole, constitutional and political is-
sues arise as a result of  the UK decision, as well as the 
direct economic consequences. The challenge can be 
framed in stark terms: will Brexit be the catalyst for 
an unravelling of  the European integration project, 
or, with the removal of  a member that has long been 
the awkward partner, an opportunity to move for-
wards. In this regard, an underlying question is 
whether it is time to move on from the old debate be-
tween more or less Europe. Jean-Claude Juncker, in 
his 2015 state of  the union speech,13 remarked that 
“our European Union is not in a good state”. He 
went on to say, somewhat delphically, “there is not 
enough Europe in this Union. And there is not 
enough Union in this Union”. 
In some domains, he is correct: for the Eurozone to 
function effectively, it will require increased integra-
tion, notably in relation to many of the proposals for 
fiscal and political union raised in the Five Presidents’ 
Report. Thus far, these plans have been side-lined and 
discordant views are being expressed by Europe’s two 
presidents (Juncker and Tusk), as well as national lead-
ers about the wisdom of new integrative steps. A fur-
ther paradox is, though, that they will have to be con-
fronted before long if  the EMU is to be completed. 
However, in other respects, the ‘federal Europe’ project 
was yesterday’s and it is more probable that the Union 
of the future will increasingly take the form of differ-
entiated integration (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 
2014). This may be the true legacy of Brexit.
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